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COHEN v. COHEN
"ALIMONY" FOR THE SUPPORT OF BOTH
WIFE AND CHILD
Cohen v. Cohen'
The plaintiff-appellant-wife was awarded an absolute
divorce and $7.50 per week for the "support of herself and
the infant child." The husband failed to pay, and the wife
sought to enforce payment through contempt proceedings.
The husband's contention was that the provision was not in
fact alimony, but that part of it must be regarded as a pro-
vision for the support of the infant, which provision could
not be enforced by imprisonment for contempt.' The
Chancellor held that under the terms of the decree the
award provided for the support of the infant child, as well
as alimony for the wife and could not be enforced by an
action for contempt and so dismissed the contempt pro-
ceedings. The wife appealed. Held: The Chancellor erred
in dismissing appellant's petition to have appellee held in
contempt of court.
This case is of great significance, in the light of the
Bushman case,' in which the court held, in brief, that
though provisions for the support of the children and the
maintenance of the wife are commonly embraced in the
same decree, those for the support of the children are not
alimony, and consequently that part of the decree is within
the protection of the constitutional inhibition against im-
prisonment for debt, and obedience thereto cannot be en-
forced by imprisonment as for contempt of court.
The Constitution of Maryland 4 provides that "No per-
son shall be imprisoned for debt." The term "debt" as
used in this section means an obligation arising otherwise
than from a sentence of a court for a breach of the peace or
crime.' This would lead one to believe that a decree of a
court of equity for "alimony" would be but a debt and
hence not enforceable by imprisonment for contempt. The
law, however, is otherwise, for it has been repeatedly held
in our courts that alimony is not a debt, and payment can
'197 Ati. 564 (Md. 1938).
'Md. Constitution, Art. 3, See. 38; Md. Code, Art. 26, See. 4; Miller,
Equity Procedure, See. 244; Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 174; 145
Ati. 488 (1929).
3 Bushman v. Bushman, 8upra note 2.
' Art. 3, See. 4.
5 5 Md. 337, 350 (1854) ; 120 Md. 553, 564; 87 Atl. 1080 (1913).
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be enforced by imprisonment for contempt.' This is also
the view held by the text writers.7
The Court, in Dickey v. Dickey s expressed itself as
follows:
"However, the obligation to pay alimony in a di-
vorce proceeding is not regarded as a debt but a duty
growing out of the marital relationship and resting
upon a sound public policy, and so this obligation may
be enforced by attachment of the person for contempt,
and the defendant may be imprisoned unless he can
purge himself of the contempt by paying or by showing
that he has neither the estate nor the ability to pay."
A provision by a court of equity for the support of a
child is a debt within the meaning of the Constitution.' In
addition, the section of the Maryland Code ° dealing with
the enforcement of decrees in equity provides ". . . but
where the decree only directs the payment of money, no
defendant shall be imprisoned . . " This latter prin-
ciple has been upheld by our courts1 and text writers. 2
The point to be considered now is what constitutes ali-
mony. In the Bushman case 3 it was stated that "Alimony
is a periodical allowance for the wife's support when she
is separated or divorced from her husband, and so is in the
form of a sum of money to be paid from time to time out
of the property or wages of the husband. It continues
during the joint lives of the husband and wife, or so long
as they live apart." In the determination of the amount of
alimony to be awarded the wife, the court may consider
the father's obligation to support his infant children, but
the father's liability to support children is governed by
Feigley v. Feigley, 7 Md. 537, 563 (1855); McCurley v. McCurley, 60
Md. 185, 189 (1883) ; Mann v. Mann, 144 Md. 518, 524; 125 Atl. 74 (1924) ;
Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 681, 141 Atl. 387 (1928) ; Bushman v. Bush-
man, 157 Md. 166, 170; 145 Atl. 488 (1929).
Schouler, Marriage and Divorce (6th ed.) Secs. 1843, 1850, 1851, 1853.
2 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, 2005, Secs. 834, 1096. Miller, Equity
Procedure, Sec. 244, n. 4.
Supra, note 6.9 Art. 3, Sec. 38; Bushman v. Bushman, supra note 2, 157 Md. 171.
10 Art. 16, Sec. 205.
" Miller v. Gittings, 85 Md. 601, 618 (1879) ; Keighler v. Ward, 8 Md. 254
(1855) ; Dickey v. Dickey, supra note 6.
11 Miller, Equity Procedure, Secs. 242, 244, 270; Phelps, Equity Juris-
prudence, Sec. 124.
IL Supra note 2, 157 Md. 172.
14 Ibid, 157 Md. 170; Wygodsky v. Wygodsky, 134 Md. 344, 106 Atl. 698
(1919) ; Hood v. Hood, 138 Md. 355, 364, 113 Atl. 895 (1921) (as to alimony
pendente lite) ; 2 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce, and Separation, 401-407; 2
Schouler, Marriage and Divorce, Sees. 1814-1817 inc.
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different principles. 15 Although the court may consider
the children in determining the amount of alimony, and
may impose provisions for support of children in the same
decree with the provisions for the maintenance of the wife,
the provisions for the support of children are not "ali-
mony" and the husband's refusal to pay money to support
children is a refusal to comply with a divorce decree which
imposes an obligation in the nature of a debt and obedience
to that part of the decree cannot be enforced by imprison-
ment for contempt of court. 6 The rule therefore is set-
tled, in the cases where a single decree contains separate
provisions for the wife and for the children. The provision
for the wife is alimony and enforceable by imprisonment
for contempt. The provision for the children is a debt and
within the protection of the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.17 The Bushman case makes it even
more clear that the husband cannot be imprisoned, in the
case of an equity decree in a mere custody proceeding, s
for in this proceeding there can be no provision made for
the wife.
The principal case, however, presents still a further
problem-what if there is but one provision that purports
to provide for both the wife and child. Is such a provision
alimony, or does the fact that it extends to the child, pre-
vent it from being such? In Roberts v. Roberts, 9 the
Court, by way of dictum, and relying in part on Bushman
v. Bushman" said: "Although an allowance in that form is
frequently made, the better practice is to separate the re-
spective allowances made for the support of the wife and
of minor children, for the allowance for the support of the
children is not alimony . . ." Yet the Court in the case
under discussion,2' without any reference to Roberts v.
Roberts laid down the rule that a provision of "alimony
for the support of the wife and child" is alimony and hence
is enforceable by imprisonment for contempt. It justified
its decision by saying that the decree went no further than
to recognize the needs of the wife in fixing the amount of
alimony.
While there may be a constitutional barrier to prevent
the imprisonment of a father who fails to provide for his
"'Bushman v. Bushman, supra note 2, 157 Md. 170.
"L Ibid, 157 Md. 171.
17 Ibid.
18 Md. Code, Art. 16, See. 80.
'1 160 Md. 513, 524; 154 At. 95 (1931).20 Supra note 2, 157 Md. 170.
21 Supra note 1.
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child under an equity decree, yet this does not mean that
the same result cannot be achieved by means of another
procedure,22 namely, a criminal prosecution. We have a
statute2" which provides, in brief, that when one, without
just cause, deserts or wilfully neglects to provide for the
support and maintenance of his wife or minor child, he is
guilty of a misdemeanor. After conviction thereunder,
instead of imposing punishment the trial court, in its dis-
cretion, may pass an order directing the defendant to pay a
certain sum weekly for the space of three years to the wife.
The defendant is then released from custody on probation,
for that period. A separate procedure is set up for Balti-
more City,24 whereby the bulk of these cases may be handled
by the Domestic Relations Department of the States At-
torney's office without the necessity of a court hearing. This
criminal punishment, however, cannot be used to aid a wife
in enforcing payment of support of children when that sup-
port has been granted by an equity court in connection with
a suit for divorce, or otherwise, because of the constitu-
tional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. If the
case is handled in the Domestic Relations Department or
in the Criminal Court, it is handled on the basis of a crim-
inal prosecution for non-support. All orders for support
passed by either of these agencies are effective from the
date of passage and are not made retroactive to include any
arrears that may have accumulated under decrees of the
equity courts. The case in hand, therefore, has cleared up
the confusion which existed as to whether the Domestic
Relations Department or the Equity Court was the proper
agency to give the wife relief by way of punishing the hus-
band under such a decree.
The principal case does suggest one problem, the an-
swer to which seems in doubt. Granting that one may be
punished for contempt for disobeying a single decree pro-
viding both for wife and child, and that the better practice
is to make separate provisions therefor, may the husband-
father, by timely appeal, secure a correction of an actually
imposed decree and a splitting apart of the two provisions?
Should he thus be permitted to avoid a contempt sentence
by paying only the part set aside for the wife? A search
of the possibly applicable authorities discloses no answer.
12 For a comparative treatment of the various procedures for obtaining a
court order for regular payments of support to a child, see note (1937) 2
Md. L. Rev. 60.
S Md. Code, Art. 27, Sees. 87, 88, 89.
" Md. Code Supp., Art. 27, Secs. 87A-87H.
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Perhaps the form of the decree is discretionary with the
Chancellor, not to be disturbed on appeal. Perhaps it is
best not to permit a defendant to be under a greater sanc-
tion for one part of the decree than for the other.
If this be so, then (if the Chancellor be willing to make
but a single order) a father can only get the benefit of the
Bushman case's exemption from contempt sentence when
the order for the support of the child is imposed in a mere
custody case, or, if in a divorce case, where the wife, either
for economic or conduct reasons, is entitled to no alimony
at all. So long as fathers who do not support their children
may be punished under the alternative criminal method,
and so long as husbands may be punished both by this
method and for contempt of court, any step which limits
the doctrine of the Bushman case is to be applauded.
TENURE AND REMEDIES UNDER SCHOOL
TEACHERS' CONTRACTS
Board of Education of Washington County v. Cearfoss.1
Plaintiff was employed on July 1, 1921 as a school
teacher by the defendant school board under a uniform
state-wide contract adopted by the State Board of Edu-
cation in pursuance of power delegated to it by the legis-
lature.2  This contract provided that either party could
"terminate it at the end of the first or second school year
by giving thirty days notice in writing to the other dur-
ing the month of June or July". Further provisions speci-
fied that the contract should continue from year to year
subject only to the right of the County Board to dismiss
the teacher for cause shown as governed by Art. 77 Sec.
86,8 in which case the teacher would have the right to ap-
peal to the State Superintendent if the decision of the
County Board were not unanimous. The school board re-
fused to reassign the teacher on June 30, 1930 without
cause being shown. In the first case a demurrer to the
declaration in the action to recover for breach was over-
1 168 Md. 34, 176 Ati. 48 (1934) ; same case on earlier appeal, 165 Md.
178, 166 AtI. 732 (1933). Although the cases involved three plaintiffs, the
case is considered as if only one were involved as the facts and holding
pertaining to each are similar.2 Md. Code, Art. 77, Sec. 11.
3 "Any county board of education may, on the recommendation of the
county superintendent, suspend any teacher . . . for immorality, dis-
honesty, intemperance, insubordination, incompetence, or wilful neglect of
duty . . ."
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